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1. Introduction 
 
This paper brings together slightly edited material from previously published articles in 
which I looked at both Sloterdijk and Anders in direct connection to Heidegger. In those articles 
I attempted to draw attention to an aspect not only of Heidegger’s, Sloterdijk’s and Anders’s 
work, but also of the work of authors such as Adorno, Beckett, Derrida, Lacan, and, more 
recently, Žižek – the aspect of the traumatic. My reflections on the traumatic contained in those 
articles, tied to Heidegger as they were, were largely concerned with metaphysical or ontological 
questions. They did not attempt to answer the question of how to establish an ethics of 
technology. I will now, at the end of this paper, provide some scattered hints on how to address 
this question in connection with my previous reflections.  
 
2. What do I mean by Traumatology? 
 
What should we take the term Traumatology to mean? Given this paper’s natural 
constraints, I must content myself with only a brief outline of my arguments in this regard. 
First of all, traumatic experiences have a distinct “logic” or “structure.” A first 
characteristic of these experiences is that they create a tension that is eminently radical – namely, 
the tension between the two farthest existential poles, being and nothingness. A second 
characteristic, which follows from the initial tension, concerns the problem of immunization, its 
success or lack thereof and the reasons for either. 
On a second level the question arises of what trauma is and under which perspective are 
we to consider or understand the phenomenon of trauma. The two aspects are linked – what we 
mean by trauma is largely dependent on the perspective from which we consider it. There are 
three fundamental perspectives or types of perspectives that seem noteworthy to me: the 
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psychological, the sociological and the philosophical. These perspectives often overlap to a 
lesser or greater extent. The reason for this overlap is that there could hardly be a greater variety 
of ways in which scholars have understood the concept of trauma. This diversity and 
heterogeneity of approaches has itself led to the creation of distinct trauma concepts. And these 
distinct concepts do not map neatly onto the three kinds of perspective. In order to make this 
introductory caveat clearer, I shall simplify a bit: one can make a rough distinction between an 
individual trauma, a collective trauma – and here between a collective trauma experienced 
individually or directly and one experienced only indirectly – and a “humanity trauma.”1 Though 
it would seem intuitive to link the first form of trauma to psychology, the second to sociology 
and the third to philosophy, this would be too reductive. Psychology, sociology and philosophy 
often refer to two or even three of the forms in their analysis. 
All three forms of trauma are concerned with the actually experienced or otherwise 
imagined intrusion of an external, violent power in an entity, resulting in the collapse, either real 
or imagined, of that entity’s immune system. The collapse of this entity’s immune system is 
experienced as a kind of powerlessness, i.e. as a capital inability to safeguard the security, the 
life and the existence of said entity. As Freud nicely put it, it is an experience similar to the 
breaking of a dike or a rampart.2 At the individual level, experiences such as rape, torture, car 
accidents, etc. can be traumatic. These usually lead to severe dissociation of the personality. As 
to the collective level, I will limit myself to two hints of possible instances. First, works such as 
those of Volkan3 show that trauma narratives can aid in the creation of collective (cultural, 
religious, national, etc.) identities, and a fortiori, also include a potential for violence by 
designating a common external enemy, an act intimately connected with the idea of security and 
hence connected to the immunity of the group or collective entity. Regarding individually 
experienced collective traumas, the relevance of two questions was discussed early on, questions 
which are not unimportant for our purposes. According to Freud’s speculations an individually 
experienced collective trauma had a higher “chance of recovery” when the victim managed to 
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identify with collective ideals or ideals concerning a representative leader figure. This, however, 
said Freud, often resulted in the removal of ordinary, rationally motivated inhibitions, such as the 
willingness to commit brutally violent acts.4 At the philosophical level, it comes down to the 
question of the “traumaticity” of our “Being.” Texts from Adorno, Benjamin, Derrida, Rorty, 
Heidegger, and, indeed, Sloterdijk and Anders, show that the issue of “traumaticity” in 
philosophy is virulent. 
Were we to limit our philosophical perspective on the phenomenon of trauma to its 
“metaphysical” or “anthropological” aspects, three aspects would strike me as essential: (i) the 
pursuit of immunization, of safety for oneself or for another “equivalent” entity. This pursuit 
presupposes the awareness of something threatening – otherwise the quest for immunization 
would lack any motivation. It is therefore about Being and Nothingness, or Being and a potential 
“nihilating” force; (ii) a radical pursuit of immunization contains in itself the moment of 
violence, which is therefore itself a “nihilating force”, oriented however to its very own Being. 
Herein lies a dilemma that can manifest itself “phenomenologically” in different ways. (iii) The 
“dialectic” of Being and Nothingness, which in (i) and (ii) manifests itself in a being or entity, 
may nevertheless expand beyond this entity. This can be conceived in entirely distinct ways 
depending on the philosopher. For Heidegger it would concern the question of in what way is the 
traumaticity inherent in the history and logic of Being. For Adorno, traumatical would be the 
false effort to ignore the negative dialectic inherent in history. 
After these admittedly stenographic preliminary remarks, I would like to go into some 
further traumatological aspects, such as those discussed in the writings of Sloterdijk and Anders. 
 
3. Sloterdijk 
 
3.1. Some background theses 
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In the first volume of his Spheres-trilogy, entitled Bubbles5, Sloterdijk develops a 
philosophical project directly opposed to theories that start from the unreflective primordiality of 
the “I” as a knowing and sentient subject. This critique bears not only on post-Cartesian 
philosophy, but in principle on all philosophy, even when the philosophical starting point is not 
the self, the subject, or even “human beings” as a whole. For Sloterdijk, not only is the “I” a 
postnatal phenomenon but so are those experiences that in Heidegger are linked with 
“nothingness.” First is the primordially given Being-With (Mitsein), as Being-In (In-Sein) of the 
fetus in the mother’s uterus and as co-dyad (Mit-Dyade) of fetus and placenta – a Being-In (In-
Sein), which has first and foremost (“zuerst und zunächst”, to use another Heideggerian 
expression) a spatial quality and a certain subsequent spatial sensitivity that may awaken before 
any temporal experience is underwent. Nothingness and the I come into the fore only at birth – 
and so there is here already a first traumatological moment. With birth, the already nine-month 
old human being is thrown out of the absolutely given Being-In into the outside world. The 
primordial Being-In, which, according to Sloterdijk, exhibits a tri-partite structure of “Something 
is with Something in Something”, now undergoes the fundamental fragility both of Being-With 
(Mitsein) and Being-In (Inseins). Being-With (Mitsein) loses the character of immediacy and is 
now mediated, and the “In” loses the character of the “familiar” (Heimliches) and now becomes 
the “uncanny” (Unheimliches), the monstrous (Ungeheures). It is the first, and indeed the first 
spatially-sensitive experience of Nothingness. The Being-In, according to Sloterdijk, is now 
“coupled” to the “outward bound” tension, where “outward” has the connotation of both a spatial 
and temporal “ecstatic provisional going ahead”: Being-In becomes “the inhabiting in the 
monstrous.”6 
The putative Heideggerian objection, that here the approach should be fundamental-
ontological rather than anthropological, is, according to Sloterdijk, misguided and reveals an   
unfounded aversion to the intertwining of empirical and anthropological aspects with apparently 
pure metaphysics or ontology. The Dasein is finite and begins as finite, and its beginning had 
always been an especially blind spot of “universal and pure” philosophy. If I understand 
Sloterdijk properly, then it is precisely this factual-empirical finitude which gives us insight into 
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“the metaphysical” in the sense of fundamental Being and Nothingness-structures 
(Nichtsstrukturen – may Carnap pardon me for this apparent pseudo-concept), for Sloterdijk calls 
this spatial and anthropological awareness of the “inhabiting in the monstrous” a “metaphysical 
premise"7 of our Dasein. 
As to the identifying and structural marks of the monstrous, there are even more powerful 
analogies with Heidegger here. For Sloterdijk, the sensibility towards the phenomenon of the 
monstrous arises first out of the postnatal possibility of the separation between the inner and the 
outer. The inner corresponds to the postnatal need to provide external uteri, living spaces that 
serve simultaneously as protected spaces (Schutzzonen), as immunological places. The outer in 
turn relates to the adversarial, the completely uncontrolled, that which a fortiori can endanger the 
protected spaces, that which is both universal but also highly vague (it includes all that is 
outside) and perhaps because of that, fear inducing. As danger, it symbolizes the possibility of 
the collapse of the protected space, and thus the possibility of my death, of nothingness 
belonging to me. On the other hand, this is a “general Nothingness” due to its fundamental 
indeterminacy. In this sense, it corresponds to a certain extent to Heidegger’s “Überwältigung.” 
The Heideggerian aspect (here with positive connotations) of violent action (Gewalt-tätigkeit) in 
turn corresponds to the phenomenon that Sloterdijk, in one of his texts, called the “revolution of 
beginning oneself (Revolution des Selberanfangens) against the being-already-begun 
(Angefangensein).”8 While no “I” activity is yet required in the state of fetal clinging to being-
already-begun, it becomes increasingly more so after birth. This revolution, however, and here 
too there are obvious parallels with Heidegger, is not only a revolution against the being-already-
begun in prenatal symbiosis, but also against the postnatal being-already-begun determined by 
the interpretations of others, particularly those which are linguistically articulated; or in other, 
Heideggerian words, against the “fallenness” which is simultaneously necessarily existential. On 
the other hand, as in Heidegger, this violent action is also coupled with the desire, the 
“metaphysical urge” to be at home everywhere, as Heidegger put it.9 Sloterdijk's entire Spheres 
project outlines a story of the desire to build protected spaces, second uteri – and here the 
dimension of the temporal enters significantly into the foreground –, a history of home-conquests 
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(Heim-Eroberungen) which could be understood as Sloterdijk’s version of the ‘History of 
Metaphysics’. Viewed from a structural perspective, metaphysics begins with the prenatal Being-
With (Mitsein), then finds a new foundation in the anthropological and biological conditions of 
the so-called neoteny10, according to which man, from a philo- and ontogenetic perspective, 
is/was not exposed to permanent developmental pressures due to social protected spaces. And so 
he could develop into a luxurious Being, whereby he would acquire the ability to creatively 
design new protected spaces, new forms of “inhabiting” (Wohnen). Further milestones 
(Wegmarken) on the historical road are given by the protection spaces conceived by traditional 
metaphysical and religious thought, which represent a boost toward generality and universality 
and which will be replaced by the dissociated “foam forms” of inhabiting, the protection spaces 
in the present. Sloterdijk's book You Must Change Your Life: On Anthropotechnics can be read 
from an historical perspective as an advanced analysis of the intensive training attempts that have 
been made to build stable immune spaces with controlled external interactions.11 
Like in Heidegger, Sloterdijk’s use of the term “metaphysics” is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, as already said, it is concerned with the anthropological onto- and phylogenesis of the 
“metaphysical premise”, the “inhabiting in the monstrous”, the spatial Being-In of Man, whose 
structure undergoes an historical development. Any insight in this context would be cataloged 
under “positive” metaphysics. On the other hand, Sloterdijk also uses the term “metaphysics” in 
a pejorative sense, namely the sense which denotes the now expiring, defeated historical stage of 
the “inhabiting of the monstrous,” namely the phase in which one desperately tries to maintain 
religious-metaphysical constructions, dogmas and ideologies in order to hold on to the possibility 
of establishing global, universal protection.12 According to Sloterdijk, Heidegger and others, 
“metaphysical” in the negative sense is predicated of all the thinkers who have not yet rid 
themselves of this paradigm. Here the relationship with and stance towards technological 
phenomena also comes into play. Heidegger’s technophobia is a kind of understandable defense 
against a metaphysical transformation (Wandlung) that already has taken place. It perhorresces 
the loss of self, the loss of the old humanism, the objectification of the subject, but it does not 
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understand that the challenge of man is precisely the new marriage with technology.13 This “anti-
technological hysteria” (Technikhysterie) is, according to Sloterdijk, a decadent product of a 
false metaphysical defensiveness.14 
 
3.2. Traumatological aspects in Sloterdijk 
 
Sloterdijk’s traumatology has a clearly anthropological character, though one should add 
that Sloterdijk’s anthropology is certainly bound up with ontological and metaphysical- 
cosmological claims, though not, as we have already mentioned above, in Heidegger’s sense, 
since Heidegger was indeed counted among those in the class of the “last metaphysicians.” 
According to Sloterdijk, the real drama of traumatological struggle between Being and 
Nothingness reveals itself phenomenologically in the history of the human “inhabiting” in the 
monstrous, and this history is that of the rise of the technological. Much of the focus of 
Sloterdijk’s work, especially in the Spheres, as well as in You Must Change Your Life: About 
Anthropotechnics, is devoted to the “intermonadic” (intermonadischen) conflicts between 
competing quests for and competing systems of immunization. Behind the latter lies what could 
be described as “the history of metaphysics”, provided one were to extend the precision and 
scope of the Heideggerian concept. And this history is again highly traumatological. This is 
because the collapse of certain epochal forms of searching for immunization is always a 
traumatic experience. 
In an essay entitled “Offence by Machines”,15 Sloterdijk explicitly returns to the concept 
of trauma. Offences (Kränkungen), says Sloterdijk, are challenges (Herausforderungen) to the 
immune system. Offences need not be traumatic, but they can be. This happens when the offence 
is not really overcome or when, though one knows better, one employs outdated immunization 
strategies to deal with it. The issue raised in this text is that of “the offences against mankind.” In 
other words, we are, so to speak, positioning ourselves in the field of the history of metaphysics. 
In addition to the offences detected by Freud, who saw the three major offences against mankind 
in the history of science as that which Copernicus inflicted on cosmological narcissism, the one 
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Darwin inflicted on human narcissism, and that which Freud himself inflicted on narcissistic 
reasoning via his psychoanalysis, one must, according to Sloterdijk, add a number of other 
dramatic offences which he lists as either having already occurred or as occurring in the 
foreseeable future. I cite here only the last three which, according to Sloterdijk, are bound to be 
of great concern in the near future: the computer offence, where the “mechanical” double 
embarrasses human beings due to its higher intellectual capacity; the environmental offence, 
where the nature of man’s incapacity is revealed; and the offence caused by robotics, genetics 
and bionics, where “the most intimate egological manifestations of human existence such as 
creativity, love and free will perish like will-o'-the-wisps scattered across a swamp of reflexive 
technologies, therapies and power games.”16 From this gloomy and, looking ahead to 
Blumenberg, techno-demonizing panorama full of present and future offences, Sloterdijk derives 
the conclusion that man or the Being of man can also be understood as a traumatological cogito: 
“I am offended, therefore I am.”17 
Turning now to Sloterdijk’s account of the traumatological structure of the history of 
metaphysics, I believe one can detect a kind of duplicitous or double discourse. The first 
discourse distances itself strongly from Heidegger and seems to hold a position diametrically 
opposed to him. According to him, it is wrong and therefore traumatic, to hold on to old, 
outdated strategies to combat trauma. Instead of clinging to infantile or religious forms of 
“primary narcissism”, man must ascend to the developed forms of “able narcissism” 
(Könnensnarzißmus).18 This is also the point at which the concepts of “technology” and 
“metaphysics” short-circuit. A backward, erroneous defensiveness against offences is, according 
to Sloterdijk, “reactionary”, leads to technophobia, yet the demonization of technology falling 
out of an “already robust metaphysical transformation” is a “decadent product” of an outdated 
“metaphysical defensiveness.”19 On the contrary, what is necessary is a fundamental acceptance 
of technology. This relies on an ever more globalizing networking of living spaces and living 
forms and their increasing virtualization.20 More importantly, however, is that in the new “foam-
form” of inhabiting the dream of inner and outer immunological control becomes technically 
feasible. But this in turn is connected to the most radical metaphysical change, namely that 
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which, according to Sloterdijk, man must become acquainted with: the fact that technology 
engages with the “metaphysical”, “formerly apparently autonomous field” of the subject’s 
constitution.21 In contrast, it is understandable that the old metaphysical paradigms in a somehow 
paralyzed manner experience this metaphysical transformation as loss of self, as a loss of the old 
humanism, as the objectification of the subject.22 The thesis, that man must confront itself with 
this new challenge, which should however be accompanied by a changing understanding of 
technology – rather than the old understanding of technology as domineering, technology must 
be conceptualized as homeo-technology – has, as is known, since 1999 given rise to the most 
violent polemical debates. Seen through an Heideggerian perspective, one could characterize this 
discourse so that here the loss of the essence of man is accepted voluntarily and the forgetfulness 
of being (Seinsvergessenheit) is complete. From Sloterdijk’s perspective, however, the difference 
between beings and Being is different. If it exists at all, it is that there are certain epochal 
(“metaphysical”) “modes of being” (Wesensweisen) of the traumatologically founded Being-In 
of man, whose development leads to a new essential mode of being with a new immunological 
concept of Being-In. The age of technology is distinguished from the preceding, “metaphysical” 
(understood in the pejorative sense) age by the fact that Being-In concepts (“Inhabiting-
projects”) are increasingly dissociated and de-ideologized, leading, in the long run, to a challenge 
to the “essentializing” (Wesen) (verbally understood) of the Dasein itself. But that in turn can be 
understood as a change in the mode of being (Seinswandel), both of “Being” (Sein) as well as 
existence (Dasein), whose task becomes to deal with the most extreme forms of its self-
production and the phenomenon of death. Sloterdijk’s look into the future can therefore be 
interpreted as an insight into the nature of this venture, which one, despite a sometimes naïve 
optimism, cannot charge with lacking a sense of the perversity, abysses and dangers that are 
contained in this challenge.23 By contrast, Heidegger commits the old Hegelian mistake of seeing 
his own time as the end time, as the climax of historical development. Because of the 
forgetfulness of Being is total, there is no longer any development, but only an either-or. And so 
too the counterpart of the forgetfulness of Being, the rescue of Being (Seinsrettung), acquires a 
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character of finality. Should they succeed, one would have to imagine the world as a scenario of 
ecumenical serenity, a kind of union of spectacle of nature and artistic world in which everyone 
cooperates peacefully and inspirationally in the development of one’s authenticity and that of 
others, be it things or people. 
This “charge” of an unreflective and thus dangerously naïve dichotomy – inscribed in the 
back of each traumatology – is precisely one that Sloterdijk too can raise. In a long paragraph of 
the introduction to “Domestication of Being”24, Sloterdijk proposes a brief diagnosis of the 
philosophy of the 20th century, which started as an attempt to escape a false mediocrity, which 
continued after the experience of the negative radicalism of the Second World War, at least in 
the minds of those which understood themselves as avant-garde (here Sartre’s appeal to a 
“literature of extreme situations” is mentioned, as well as existentialism in general, but also the 
neo-Marxist left). Instead, it was necessary to free themselves from this obstinate adherence to 
radicalism. Radicalism leads to hyper-morality, which in turn evokes phenomena of anti-
hypermorality. On the other hand, the deradicalization understood by postmodernism (global 
networking, disempowerment of the aggressor mentality) brings with it the risk of a new 
mediocratization. Given the new developments, that the organ for reception of the radical 
modernism of the 20th century had become virtually deaf and that no real platform was given for 
their adequate renovation, a new tendency to mediocrity arose which runs the risk of treating 
everything according to the norms of the academic routine (academic autism). And sight of the 
fact was lost, especially after the apparent defusing of the nuclear bomb threat, the East-West 
arms race, etc., that the monstrous is still among us. That is precisely the point I want to 
emphasize here: the traumatology also overtakes Sloterdijk. The primal fear of total nothingness, 
which was seemingly easily ousted by introducing the magical term ‘homeotechnology’, now 
rears its head again. And as with Heidegger it is the blindness of their radicalism and of the latent 
danger due to the false sense of security in an environment of thorough mediocrity that can be 
most dangerous. Sloterdijk’s catalogue of current monstrosities has different versions. In the 
paragraph mentioned above he identifies three scenarios: were the global networks to collapse, 
the fall would be steep; the new biological nuclear technology could make all of humanity its 
hostage; the primacy of the economic over the political could trigger a new counter-revolution of 
the political. Approximately a decade later, Sloterdijk resumes the criticism already begun in 
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Eurotaoism – Sketch for the Project of a Critique of Political Kinetics25 against the destruction of 
the environment, now to warn against the “big disaster”26 and to do so prior to any availability of 
technical means to avoid it, prior to the withdrawal of the “Being-base” for all other Being-In-
developments, i.e. before all life and Being on this planet is destroyed once and for all. And so, I 
think, we can easily find in Sloterdijk a sort of blending of two aspects, the same aspects that 
some decades before had been disavowed by Blumenberg as a consequence of demonizing forms 
of argument: first the aspect charged with manic-depressive undertones, a black and white 
drawing of conjured danger and, second, the naïve, speculative or even megalomaniac belief that 
we will be able to deal with this danger without any further accommodations. As far as I can see, 
this diagnosis still stands even when considering Sloterdijk’s 2016 article, translated in this 
volume, entitled “Das Anthropozän – Ein Prozeß-Zustand am Rande der Erd-Geschichte?”27 
(“The Anthropocene: A Process-State at the Edge of Geohistory?”). Building on an on-going 
debate, begun 15 years ago, about the legitimacy of the term “Anthropocene” in philosophical 
and cultural discourse, Sloterdijk characterizes the contemporary scene as one governed by an 
“apocalyptic logic”28, the latter caused in part by a “kinetic expressionism”29 – a concept clearly 
taken from the theses of the Eurotaoist book –, a logic consisting in self-reinforcing acceleration 
processes that lead to a self-destructive collapse. Or, in other words, that lead to a state of all or 
nothing, one in which we can hardly hope to answer adequately the challenges of life and death 
given the status quo of an ignorant managerial class both in the political and the scientific 
establishment. All the essential traumatological elements are here easily identifiable. Sloterdijk’s 
response can be read as a variation on the responses given in earlier works. Sloterdijk’s hope 
hinges on a new view of technology already denoted by the term homeotechnics, one which does 
not want to rape or conquer nature, but rather one that wishes to make use of the potentialities of 
Nature actualized through biomimetic methods at the artificial level. This harmless sounding 
program is of course not without its dangers, for without an account of its actual content, this 
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Was geschah im 20. Jahrhundert?, Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, p. 15. 
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program could be used for evil just as much as for good. The fact that applied homeotechnics 
promises a more effective (because relying on co-operation between human beings and between 
human beings and nature) immunity, a new “co-immunity”30, shows again, in conclusion, how 
strongly the logic of trauma informs even the aforementioned article. 
 
4. Günther Anders 
 
I now want to show how distinctive features of the traumatological can also be found in 
the work of Anders. 
 
4.1. Some background theses 
 
At first glance, Anders’s thought seems to concern itself obsessively with a single theme 
– that man has become capable of generating the means by which he attains the absolute power 
to definitively and irreversibly annihilate all of mankind. To have the know-how to generate such 
means is all it takes for the threat of definitive death to hover over mankind. This is the idea at 
the core of a simple and self-evident traumatology, which consists simply in man’s 
powerlessness in the face of this threat. But Anders’s philosophy goes farther, and it is that I now 
wish to develop. 
The powerlessness of man at this first ontic level seems exceedingly obvious. Even so it 
has eluded man’s understanding, due, in the first instance, to a phenomenon which Anders calls 
the promethean discrepancy.31 The promethean discrepancy consists in the wide, 
disproportionate gulf between kinds of abilities: we are able, as homines fabri, of making 
something whose effects and whose essence we can neither adequately feel nor adequately 
represent. We are therefore not in a position to be able to relate ethically and morally with the 
product of our making. For this reason, contemporary man lives, according to Anders, in a 
permanent schizophrenic state. He makes something which he can no longer affectively 
understand or even adequately represent. This discrepancy between distinct human faculties is 
                                                             
30 SLOTERDIJK, Peter (2016), „Das Anthropozän – Ein Prozeß-Zustand am Rande der Erd-Geschichte?“, in Idem, 
Was geschah im 20. Jahrhundert?, Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, p. 43. 
31 ANDERS, Günther (1988), Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen. Vol. 1: Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten 
technischen Revolution. 7th ed., München: Beck, pp. 267ff. 
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therefore increasing. While the ability to make and produce may grow without limit, our 
emotional and representational faculties cannot. Hence the gulf between our different faculties is 
increasingly and irreversibly widened. 
Anders does not restrict himself to the ontic threat of man’s annihilation posed by the 
atomic bomb. Behind this threat there is another, less obvious, more hidden, and if we were to 
use the old distinction between essence and existence, we would call it a threat to the essence of 
man. This threat is tied to a human behavior, which, Heideggerianly speaking, happens in the 
realm of Man. In the first volume of Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, in a separate chapter, 
Anders addresses the so-called promethean shame.32 This shame resides, once again, in a 
profound discrepancy, that is, in a disproportion. In the face of the increasing perfection of his 
products, man feels something like an inferiority complex. He measures himself with the 
measure of his increasingly more powerful and perfect products, which instills in him the feeling 
of not being able to compete with them. Consequently, he feels shame for his physical, psychic 
and intellectual human condition, shame for not being a being who was made but merely one 
who was born. One way of fighting this shame is to idealize the unattainable: man wants to 
become like his machines, and if he is unable to do so, he wants at least to be able to create the 
false appearance of being just as perfect as his products. Anders believes this phenomenon can 
be identified in a variety of day-to-day domains such as the practice of putting on makeup, our 
reaction to automated labor, the obsessive concern with photography and other modes of 
representation, etc. 
The wish to become the same as one’s products has been interiorized in the behavior of 
the modern man to such an extent that not only does he not understand what is happening, he 
does not even want to be confronted with the suspicion that it may be happening. On the 
contrary, he invests all his energy, all his resolve, in order to attain the unattainable ideal. The 
respective approaches to this phenomenon reveal some parallels with those of Sloterdijk 
regarding the anthropotechnical exercises, and may in fact have influenced Sloterdijk directly, 
since Sloterdijk explicitly refers to Anders’s work.33 Anders uses the term Human Engineering to 
denote these exercises, which appear innocuous and are socially valued. What in fact happens is 
                                                             
32 ANDERS, Günther (1992), Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen. Vol. 2: Über die Zerstörung des Lebens im Zeitalter 
der dritten industriellen Revolution. 4th ed., München: Beck, pp. 21-95. 
33 E.g., in “Die Domestikation des Seins” (SLOTERDIJK, Peter (2001), Nicht gerettet. Versuche nach Heidegger. 
Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, p. 208), where already appears the core idea of anthropotechnics largely developed only 
later in SLOTERDIJK, Peter (2012), Du mußt dein Leben ändern. Über Anthropotechnik. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. 
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that these exercises lead to the emptying of man’s being, precisely because it puts into practice 
the leveling of man and machine. This will lead directly and inevitably to the technologically 
planned production of man himself, which, according to Anders, is already taking place.34 
The integration of man and machine, which leads to the replacement of man with 
machines, reveals itself, according to Anders, at a variety of levels, of which I will name but a 
few. 
The foundations of ethics, politics, economics, etc., are, according to Anders, sabotaged 
and corrupted by the logic of the superiority of the technical device. Technical devices are the 
ones which makes demands to man. It is they that ask what man has to offer so that they can 
show and fulfill all their potential, the full spectrum of their features. When economic or political 
decisions must be made, either at the national or the international level, one cannot trust the 
limited capacities of man. Rather, one ought to delegate major decisions to the calculus of data 
processing devices. To trust man with the decision of when to launch nuclear weapons is highly 
risky, and already in the last century, such decisions were largely delegated to computer 
programs. In what concerns consumerism, Anders stresses, as does Heidegger, that it is the 
products themselves that demand an attitude of fast consumption, an attitude of 
Schonungslosigkeit, i.e. of deliberate carelessness. To preserve, fix and repair devices and things 
is more expensive than simply throwing them away and buying newer models. 
 
4.2. Traumatological aspects in Anders 
 
Behind this phenomenology of carelessness and the gulf between man and the technical 
device, something else is hiding, and this something else leads me once again to the logic of 
trauma. I shall focus on four fundamental aspects through which this traumatology is made 
manifest. 
 
(i) Man strives to overcome clearly serious and existential threats yet, by doing it, he 
cooperates with his own annihilation. This concerns not only nuclear weapons 
and the ontic survival of man, but, at bottom, it concerns his essence. 
                                                             
34 ANDERS, Günther (1988), Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen. Vol. 1: Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten 
technischen Revolution. 7th ed., München: Beck, p. 20. 
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The wanting-to-be-like-machines reveals a lack of measure from several perspectives: it 
is a false Anmaßung, a superbia (arrogance) or false presumption which longs for its own 
perfection, in turn caused by a false Anmessung, a false integration which takes as its standard 
the logic of the product, of that which is technically achievable. In a hidden dialectic, the longed 
for perfection reveals itself as a self-inflicted humiliation resulting in extinction. This extinction 
is of a new, unheard sort, far graver than any suicide or fatality. The exact interchangeability 
which exists in the realm of products – which man envies, experiencing his own “uniqueness” as 
a flaw – encloses in itself the idea of the overcoming of natural “death”, and hence the 
overcoming of an existential necessity, possibility and “capacity” of the human being. Not 
knowing and not being able to die, in the sense also delineated by Heidegger, happens when the 
phenomenon of death is no longer among the realm of the possible; in other words, when it’s 
modality, in its threefold Kantian sense, seems to be delegated, indelibly, to the arbitrary 
deliberation of the “new” man. And hence, not only to Heidegger but also to Anders, man’s 
overcoming of death leads to the death of the essence of the human species35 and, consequently, 
to the death of the human species as such. 
 
(ii) The almost complete ignorance of these events. 
 
Like Heidegger, Anders too believes there is a tremendous lack of awareness concerning 
the growing emptying of the being of man. According to Anders, we have lost the capacity to be 
afraid, and, more fundamentally, the capacity to feel anguish. The absence of anguish is related 
to the inability to keep up affectively with the world of fabricated devices; this lack acquires 
dimensions never before imaginable the more the emptying of the human being advances. 
According to Anders, nihilism has entered a new stage. It is no longer either apocalyptic or 
suicidal but rather, as Samuel Beckett has brilliantly shown, a nihilism which is itself unable to 
be a nihilism.36 It is a state in which man, in his profound feeling of meaninglessness, has 
become incapable of feeling either fear or boredom. Whenever man still shows residual signs of 
                                                             
35 ANDERS, Günther (1988), Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen. Vol. 1: Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten 
technischen Revolution. 7th ed., München: Beck, pp. 47-56. 
36 In this regard, see the text “Sein ohne Zeit. Zu Becketts Stück <En attendant Godot>”, in ANDERS, Günther 
(1988), Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen. Vol. 1: Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten technischen Revolution. 7th 
ed., München: Beck, pp. 213-231). 
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his proper nature, when, for instance, he feels a strong rebellious impulse of rage against the 
machines or against the conditions of labor, he does not usually unleash this rage directly upon 
those who cause it. Rather he throws himself into those other machines or socio-technological 
offerings conceived for that purpose – video games, arcades, etc. – or he mutilates himself so to 
obtain proof of his own flesh and blood existence.37  
 
(iii) Man’s inability to face this death threat is part of his nature. To fight this inability 
is an enterprise doomed to fail, for it itself leads even more surely to death. 
 
Promethean shame is not a shame felt by this or that individual. It is the shame of 
humanity, that is, of man as such. Just as the child that hides behind her mother once visitors 
arrive feels simultaneously embarrassed and afraid of being exposed to the world as an 
individual, of not being able to hide in the being-with-others, promethean shame is the 
embarrassment and fear of not being able to do anything against the fact of not being a non-I. 
Freud called the longing to be freed from the ego the death drive; nevertheless, unlike Anders, he 
did not connect this drive with the longing to become a device. 
 
(iv) Escaping into the everyday worsens our ignorance. 
 
Here Anders’s reflections come very close to Heidegger’s. The escape or flight into the 
everyday, the day-to-day humdrum and the ordinary, the perfect adaptation to the common 
opinions and stereotyped behaviors, all those worsen one’s ignorance of traumatology. One of 
the traumatological structures related to the everyday is the irresolvable aporia in which products 
ask of us the impossible: either, following the stream of dominant opinion, we give in to its 
demands, which, however, results in our long term extinction as human beings; or we do not give 
in, but then we are reduced to nothing, to a destroyed entity, undeserving of either self-esteem or 
that of others. The vague feeling of not being able to deal with this situation, of being its hostage, 
is traumatic.38 The perspective of those who criticize consumerism, the doctrines of the necessity 
                                                             
37 Slavoj Žižek presents a nearly identical account of the nature of selfmutilation, cf. Žižek, Slavoj / Daly, Glyn 
(2006), Arriscar o impossível. Conversas com Žižek. Transl. Vera Ribeiro. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, p. 147. 
38 ANDERS, Günther (1988), Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen. Vol. 1: Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten 
technischen Revolution. 7th ed., München: Beck, p. 44. 
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of progress and the marvelous advances of medicine, is wide and well known. Anders believes, 
however, that there is a growing tendency of immunization against these disquieting critiques. 
Those voices which alert us to the growing loss of reality due to the growing immersion in a 
world of technological devices and their demands are often ridiculed.39 Perhaps particular to 
Anders is his stress on the “tabooization” and punishment of this critique. Even in those cases in 
which this critique is accepted and seriously considered, the assumption is that all we need to 
address it is to employ technological or politically controllable measures. A discussion that 
would get to the heart of the matter is still, according to Anders, either forbidden or simply 
mocked. 
 
5. Final Remarks 
How can these reflections be linked to our concern about liquid technoethics? 
One could first establish a kind of commonality between Sloterdijk and Anders. Any general 
ethics, and in particular an ethics of technology, falls short if it does not see that it is a kind of 
theoretical reflection dominated by a sub-conscious pursuit of immunization or perfection, which 
is suicidal in the final analysis, or, as Derrida would say, which unconsciously follows a auto-
immunizing tendency. A higher ethics is first an ethics of technology because the pursuit of 
immunization or perfection is linked to technical perfecting in a fundamental way. On the other 
hand, this higher ethics is also liquid, namely because it cannot fundamentally find a firm. Their 
efforts, both Anders’s and Sloterdijk’s, are nothing but again the self-preservation of the human 
species, even though they are done at an allegedly reflective level. Anders provides us with an 
ethical recipe for this target: the observance of new categorical imperatives, which are 
nevertheless merely necessary propaedeutic workouts, in form of aesthetic and gymnastic 
exercises designed to expand our emotional and representational capacities.40 For Sloterdijk, the 
term homeotecnology is strongly underdetermined and looks more like a pipe dream. Both in 
Anders and Sloterdijk one also misses that the risk of suicidal overreaction is taken into account 
by the somewhat naïve “meta” solutions. From the perspective of Adorno, one could argue that 
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der dritten industriellen Revolution. 4th ed., München: Beck, p. 44. 
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this negative dialectics has not yet been taken to its logical conclusion. Another type of general 
objection would be to unmask the dramatic dichotomy of Being and Nothingness, which 
underlies the concept of trauma – a position that can be attributed to Blumenberg. There is much 
more to be said about this – a task I would like to carry out in another paper. 
 
Translated by Luís Manuel Pinto de Sá  
 
